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Abstract 
Olivia Hope Davis: “There’s Only This”: Atheism and the Search for Meaning in Ian 
McEwan’s Fiction  
(Under The Direction Of Dr. Daniel Stout) 
 
In this thesis, I offer readings of Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love, Saturday, and The 
Children Act to study the relationship between meaning and faith. This is an important 
question because some New Atheists have pointed to McEwan’s work as proof that 
meaning is possible in the absence of God. In this thesis I suggest that while McEwan 
makes a strong case for the possibility of meaning through aesthetic experiences, he also 
complicates meaning by suggesting that it is only achievable in the context of belief in 
the irreducibility of ideas like love, beauty, and wonder.  
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Introduction 
  
Our science mocks magic and the human heart, 
Our knowledge is the brutal mastery of the known, 
But science could become a force for good: 
The planet does not turn for us alone. 
Science is a form of wonder, knowledge a form of love. 
Are we too late to love ourselves? 
Shall we change or shall we die? 
 --- Ian McEwan, Or Shall We Die  
 
In his essay “Literature, Science, and Human Nature,” Ian McEwan draws parallels 
between literature and science, suggesting that each explores our “common nature” (19). 
We can read writers from “a time remote from our own, or from a culture that was 
profoundly different from our own,” because we share a “common emotional ground” 
with those authors (11). In the same way, science “binds” us together; our DNA proves 
our common origin (19). “If there are such human universals that transcend culture,” then 
looking at literature might reveal our common desires, revealing which questions are 
most innate to human nature (12). Both of these subjects – literature and science – help us 
define what it means to be human. 
Even though literature and science explore our common nature, they provide 
different, but not conflicting, insights about ourselves. McEwan’s understanding of 
humanity requires both disciplines. He says that these two methods of inquiry are “two 
noble and distinct forms of investigation into our condition” (19). Literature is not 
? ?? ?
subservient or reliant upon science, and vice versa. We can read other writers because we 
share a “common emotional ground, some deep reservoir of assumptions” with them; any 
assumption – especially about something emotional – is necessarily unscientific. It is not 
automatically irrational (“common sense” does not seem irrational), but it is beyond the 
empirically verifiable. Because they deal with different domains of ideas, both literature 
and science are necessary for a complete understanding of our common nature. 
Because he suggests that science is only one aspect of human nature, it follows 
that McEwan believes that there is something more to life than that which is describable 
by science. Empirical explanations cannot give a full account of what human nature is if 
human nature includes ideas that do not have empirical grounding. Instead, if McEwan’s 
suggestion that both literature and science are essential to understanding who we are is 
correct, our common nature is something that includes scientific explanations but is not 
bound by them. A full understanding of what it means to be human includes both the 
empirical facts of our biology and the irreducible – they are irreducible because they 
cannot be broken down scientifically – parts of our existence that literature reveals, such 
as things like love, beauty, and wonder. These things, which are not rationally justifiable, 
unify us as a species with a common nature, suggesting that there is something more to 
our lives than that for which purely physical explanations can account.  
This combination – science and literature – allows for meaning because meaning 
is not something that can be explained rationally. The impulse we have to find meaning 
cannot be reduced to chemical reactions, the result of natural selection, or a peculiar 
accident in our genetic lineage. If it is reduced to any of these things, meaning becomes a 
mechanistic process, and when this happens, it itself becomes meaningless. As a product 
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of mere random vibrations of atomic particles, it signifies nothing. The idea of meaning 
cannot exist in a purely scientific worldview because such a view allows for nothing that 
cannot be empirically tested; the concept of meaning is rejected because it demands 
another way of being understood. McEwan solves this problem by not taking a rational, 
empirically based viewpoint, and instead suggesting that meaning, while unexplained 
scientifically, can be explored through literature.  
For McEwan, the nonphysical parts of our nature are just as real as those that are 
physical and the question of meaning is a universal expression of our common nature. 
The question of meaning is just as important as mapping the human genome when it 
comes to understanding what it means to be human. In his 2014 novel The Children Act, 
Jehovah’s Witness Adam Henry receives a life-saving blood transfusion and then loses 
his faith. When he confronts Fiona, the judge who ordered the transfusion that violated 
his religious convictions, she realizes that “[Adam] came to find her, wanting what 
everyone wanted…Meaning” (220). The universality of the problem of meaning — 
Adam wants what “everyone wanted” — suggests that there is something about it that 
transcends the individual. Raising the question of meaning becomes an expression of our 
own common nature; the question of what makes life worth living — where is its value? 
— connects all of us. 
Throughout his novels, McEwan features characters that answer this question 
with their religions. Adam Henry’s faith brought him meaning even when his death, at 
the age of 17, seemed inevitable. Adam says that an elder at his church told him that if 
Adam died, “it would have a fantastic effect on everyone…It would fill our church with 
love” (113). The infinite meaning that religion gives – promising a purpose in death – 
? ?? ?
makes Adam willing to give up his life. A similar idea is expressed in Enduring Love. 
Parry, a Christian who stalks Joe, the protagonist of the novel, thinks that Joe’s rejection 
of religion leads to meaninglessness: “Somewhere in among your protestations about 
God is a plea to be rescued from the traps of your own logic…you’ll be glad to say, 
Deliver me from meaninglessness” (146). Parry does not think that meaning is possible in 
the absence of God, and finds meaning through his religion. For both of these characters, 
belief in the supernatural gives them meaning through a cosmic connection with the 
divine that lasts after death. 
Indeed, the universal desire for meaning may be best evidenced by the abundance 
of religions and, for some, their billions of adherents. The ideas of McEwan’s characters 
are mirrored in nonfiction writing from Christians. In C. S. Lewis’ essay “Is Theology 
Poetry?” he writes, “I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen, not only 
because I see it, but because by it I see everything else” (140). Religion provides a lens 
through which Lewis makes sense of the world; it gives an elucidating order to all of 
experience. While religions cannot be evaluated for truthfulness by the depths of meaning 
they provide (even if Christianity’s explanatory power was a catalyst to belief for Lewis), 
the emergence of supernatural mythologies — and the vigor of belief present today — 
indicates this universal desire for meaning. If meaninglessness is the problem, and 
supernatural order in the universe is the solution, theistic texts like the Bible or Torah or 
Quran may be read as a sort of literature that “exemplifies” the universal desire for 
meaning. 
However, because this desire for meaning is universal, it necessarily affects even 
those who do not believe in the supernatural. Atheism originated because people desired 
? ?? ?
a more orderly and meaningful conception of the world than that provided by ancient 
Greek myth. Hesiod’s Theogony, which portrays gods as impersonal beings who do not 
influence natural laws, presented a more orderly universe than the earlier epics of Homer 
that depict mercurial gods and corresponding chaos.  In her book The First Philosophers, 
Robin Waterfield suggests that Hesiod’s Theogony marks a “paradigm shift” in thinking, 
suggesting that instead of Homer’s capricious deities and chaos, “there is order in the 
world. And it is precisely because it is ordered that it can be comprehended by the human 
mind” (xxiii). The more orderly a world is —intelligible natural laws replace gods — the 
more meaningful it becomes because we are able to understand more about it. In Western 
Atheism, James Thrower suggests that Hesiod’s emphasis on order marked the beginning 
of an ontological divergence, later recognized by Aristotle, who says that Hesiod’s 
writing was a forerunner to naturalism that assumed the nonexistence of gods (40). 
Atheism originated from a desire for more meaning (and, thus, order) in the universe.  
However, naturalism (which is atheistic) was later criticized because in contrast to 
religious mythologies, it could not give reasons why something existed, but only 
descriptions. Plato’s Phaedo is one of the first articulations of this idea. In this piece,  
“Socrates [suggests] that a causal explanation along the lines offered by 
the physical philosophers is a limited explanation and does nothing to 
ratify those who are asking other and different questions; who are asking 
for an explanation in terms of meaning and purpose.” (Thrower 28) 
 
Naturalism alone was unable to answer the question of meaning. Because reconciling 
meaning and naturalism seemed impossible, some found that without god, nihilism was 
inevitable.  
While this critique – that without God, rationality leads to meaninglessness – is as 
ancient as atheism itself, different solutions have been offered to reconcile a naturalistic 
? ?? ?
outlook with religion. Such reconciliations attempt to preserve meaning, allowing 
humans to be free to study science without submitting to a mechanistic and meaningless 
view of the world. Aquinas’ De Veritate, for example, suggests that science and faith are 
different types of knowledge that do not contradict (Q. 14). While such solutions allow 
for meaningfulness by preserving both the idea of a god and the possibility of a lawful 
natural world, they can lead to contradictions between doctrine and empirical study. 
Several centuries later, the scientific challenge to religion culminated in Charles Darwin’s 
discoveries, which challenged even his own faith. He writes in Autobiography, “The old 
argument from design in Nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so 
conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered” (94).  After 
Darwin, it became evident that meaningfulness – if we were to have it at all – must be 
rooted in something that could not contradict science.  
Friedrich Nietzsche, who coined the term nihilism, recognized that creating 
meaning without any transcendent grounding would be a difficult undertaking. His 
famous parable “The Madman,” from The Gay Science, shows this: 
“I seek God!…Where is God gone?….We have killed him, — you and I! 
We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to 
drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole 
horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? 
Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? 
Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all 
directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through 
infinite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not 
become colder? Does not night come on continually, dark and 
darker?...God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”  
 
Like Socrates two millennia before, Nietzsche realizes that without a god, there is 
nothing to answer the question of ultimate meaning; the physical order says nothing 
about it. In Meaninglessness, W. A. Casey suggests that this godless state “confronts [the 
? ?? ?
madman] with the inherent meaninglessness of the earth, and realization that the 
transcendent order that makes human life meaningful is an illusion. The crucial 
concomitant to this is the collapse of absolute value” (26). Without a god, there is no 
“transcendent order,” and life is ultimately meaningless. It is important that what 
“collapses” for Nietzsche is “absolute value,” instead of values in general, and it is 
assumed that a “transcendent order” is the only one that can make a life “meaningful.” If 
meaningfulness can exist only on a transcendent scale, then naturalism does preclude its 
existence. However, what dies with God seems not to be meaningfulness itself, but 
instead the adjectives associated with him: ultimate, absolute, infinite, and transcendent. 
Meaning does not have to be ultimate by definition (Nietzsche recognizes this and 
suggests that accepting the inherent nihilism in the universe, and yet “not [collapsing] 
under it” is the ideal way to live (The Will to Power 9)). What Nietzsche describes in his 
parable is the need for a new framework for meaning without supernatural – or ultimate, 
or absolute, or infinite, or transcendent – recourses.  
Nihilism seems to be less the result of God’s death as much as a reaction to this 
newfound disorder – the elimination of all absolutes – left in his absence. Despite 
Nietzsche’s new framework, the absence of absolute order remained a major theme well 
into the late 19th century and persists today. While God may have served a variety of 
purposes, giving absolute order to the universe seems to be among his most important 
functions. The disorder left after God is reflected in the literature written after Darwin. In 
a survey of five nineteenth-century literary writers entitled The Disappearance of God, J. 
Hillis Miller suggests that without God, many writers experienced “disconnection.” 
“[Our] situation is essentially one of disconnection: disconnection between 
man and nature, between man and man, even between man and himself. 
? ?? ?
Only if God would return or if we could somehow reach him might our 
broken world be unified again.” (2) 
 
The desire is for “unity,” for the world to be ordered again so that it can be understood. 
Connections have been lost; there is no way to find a meaningful place for ourselves in 
this new, godless, world. In Journey Through Despair, a study of “Transformations in 
British Literary Culture” in the decades after Darwin, John A. Lester Jr. suggests that the 
new disorder might lead to meaninglessness. “After centuries of assurance, or glimpses, 
or intimations of a bond with some higher harmony, man is once more alone against a 
world either hostile or incomprehensible, or perhaps simply without meaning” (192). The 
absence of order — what was once a “higher harmony” — leads to a world that we 
cannot understand (“incomprehensible”), and nihilism ensues. Thus, in the wake of 
burgeoning science and declining religion, when we were understanding more and more 
about what physically binds us together  (natural selection, a common ancestor) we were 
less certain about how to respond to another aspect of our common nature — a desire for 
meaning. 
However, stripped of the possibility of universal meaning, writers – eventually 
leading up to McEwan – began to suggest that the nonexistence of god did not negate 
other sources of meaning like beauty or love. If these things have inherent meaning, 
atheism did not inevitably lead to nihilism. Bertrand Russell suggests that these ideas can 
exist in a godless world in his essay, “A Free Man’s Worship:” 
“Let us admit that, in the world we know, there are many things that 
would be better otherwise, and that the ideals to which we do and must 
adhere are not realized in the realm of matter. Let us preserve our respect 
for truth, for beauty, for the ideal of perfection which life does not permit 
us to attain, though none of these things meet with the approval of the 
unconscious universe.”  
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The lack of “approval of the unconscious universe” does not make our lives less 
meaningful. We do not need any transcendent sources for meaning; we are able to value 
and enjoy truth, beauty, and the “ideal of perfection” without the supernatural.  
While this question – what meaning, if any, is there for the atheist? – is ancient, 
McEwan’s novels respond to it at a particularly pivotal time in history. The current “rise 
of secularism,” which [is] more widespread and pervasive than [it] has ever [been],” adds 
new urgency to the question (Thrower 2). The New Atheist movement — consisting of a 
group of public intellectuals who deny the existence of god — has gained momentum in 
the last decade. It is known for its vehement renunciation of all theistic religions, 
especially Christianity and Islam, and Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate suggest in The 
New Atheist Novel that it can be viewed as a response to religiously motivated terrorism 
(5). The New Atheist movement has a wide audience and has led to the publication of 
many books espousing their ideas, including Richard Dawkin’s The God Delusion, Sam 
Harris’ The End of Faith, and Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural 
Phenomenon. These books have topped bestseller lists and testify to a renewed vigor in 
atheism, making the search for secular meaning – which McEwan’s novels explore – very 
timely.  
Because New Atheism seeks to change religious people’s belief systems —
Richard Dawkins writes in the preface to The God Delusion, “If this book works as I 
intend, religious readers who open it will be atheists when they put it down” — it is 
important for the movement to characterize atheism as not only true but also something 
that retains many of the positive things religion gives, including meaning (Dawkins 28). 
As a result, the New Atheists suggest that meaning is possible — and possibly even more 
? ??? ?
sustainable — within an atheistic framework. However, as McEwan suggests in his 
lecture “Literature, Science, and Common Nature,” this meaning is not found rationally. 
There is no rational route to meaning, and the New Atheists recognize this, finding 
meaning in subjective experiences of things like art. As Christopher Hitchens writes in 
God Is Not Great,  
“[Atheists] are not immune to the lure of wonder and mystery and awe: we 
have music and art and literature, and find that the serious ethical 
dilemmas are better handled by Shakespeare and Tolstoy and Schiller and 
Dostoyevsky and George Eliot than in the mythical morality tales of the 
holy books. Literature, not scripture, sustains the mind and – since there is 
no other metaphor – also the soul.” (5)  
 
Hitchens connects meaning to the “lure of wonder and mystery and awe,” and because 
these things can be experienced without belief in a god, he suggests that meaning is fully 
possible within an atheistic framework. The arts can satisfy our desire for wonder, 
mystery, and awe and lead to moral reflection – domains that are not, the New Atheists 
argue, limited to a supernatural sphere. Thus, while they do challenge the possibility of 
anything transcendent, New Atheists try to show that meaning does not need a 
transcendent framework at all, and point to the arts – especially literature – to prove their 
point. The New Atheists find meaning by going beyond that which is purely scientific 
and into the domains of beauty and wonder. They do not connect these experiences to 
god, but instead suggest that they have inherent value. 
The New Atheist movement has given particular attention to the novels of Ian 
McEwan. McEwan contributed an essay, “End of the World Blues,” to Hitchens’ 
anthology The Portable Atheist, and wrote Sweet Tooth in Hitchens’ honor. Christopher 
Hitchens wrote in the acknowledgements of his God Is Not Great: “[McEwan’s] body of 
fiction shows an extraordinary ability to elucidate the numinous without conceding 
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anything to the supernatural. He has subtly demonstrated that the natural is wondrous 
enough for anyone” (5). Hitchens suggests that McEwan’s work shows that we can have 
experiences that are awe-inspiring without any recourse to religiosity. His use of the word 
“enough” indicates that we have a need to experience the wonderful; it is, evidently, 
possible that something is not “wondrous enough.” A godless framework allows for a 
satisfying experience of wonder, making the supernatural – whether or not it exists – 
superfluous. The attention that these prominent atheists have given to McEwan’s work, 
and what Hitchens claims that McEwan’s work provides – an experience of “secular 
transcendence” –– suggests that McEwan’s fiction offers an uncommonly acute glimpse 
at meaning in New Atheism (Saturday 140). McEwan’s novels show that the “numinous” 
– Hitchens’ word, first defined as “indicating the presence of a divinity” – has become 
possible without the divine (OED). Thus, if we want a literary proof that atheism – 
particularly atheism in the twenty-first century – is not inevitably nihilistic, we should 
begin with McEwan’s novels, in which the problems of meaning considered by Hesiod, 
Nietzsche, and writers after Darwin continue to be explored.  
However, McEwan’s work is not a mere continuation of these ideas but a new 
development in them (otherwise, New Atheists could merely point back to Hesiod). He 
shows how what once led to nihilism — science — can give meaning by providing an 
aesthetic experience that is fully grounded in the natural world. In his novels, McEwan 
emphasizes that science can provide an aesthetic experience in itself by becoming 
beautiful and inciting wonder. Thus, while previous writers might have worked against 
the grain of the empirical, insisting that meaning exists in spite of mechanistic scientific 
understandings, McEwan uses science to create meaning. McEwan’s novels highlight 
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aesthetic experiences in the music and literature in addition to the sciences. These 
experiences in the natural world point to immaterial things like love, beauty, and wonder, 
and they make the world appear orderly without any supernatural grounding. Each of the 
aesthetic experiences begins at the level of sensory perception and each is a catalyst for 
meaning. McEwan’s use of both science and the arts to create meaning distinguishes him 
from the writers before him. 
 McEwan is able to argue that meaning still exists within an atheistic framework 
because he is not a materialist. His atheism does not lead to a belief that everything is 
reducible to scientific explanations or that all that exists is made of matter. As Bradley 
and Tate argue in The New Atheist Novel, “To McEwan’s eyes, a title like ‘Atheist’ does 
not begin to cover his own position precisely because it defines him according to what he 
does not believe as opposed to what he does” (16). They cite an interview McEwan did 
for The New Republic in 2008, in which he says,  
“…it is crucial that people who do not have a sky god and don’t have a set 
of supernatural beliefs assert their belief in moral values and in love and in 
the transcendence that they might experience in landscape or art or music 
or sculpture or whatever. Since they do not believe in an afterlife, it makes 
them give more valence to life itself. The little spark that we do have 
becomes all the more valuable when you can’t be trading off any moments 
for eternity.”  
 
It is essential that McEwan uses the term belief; moral values and love are not scientific 
facts but things that we choose to believe in. Because these things are inherently 
meaningful, even in the absence of a god, he chooses not to reduce them to mere products 
of chemical reactions. This aligns with his idea that literature and science explore 
different aspects of our common nature; the possibility of meaning is not a scientific 
theory because it is not an empirically testable hypothesis. McEwan is able to draw 
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meaning from aesthetic experiences – from science, music, and literature – precisely 
because he thinks that matter is not all that exists. Aesthetic experiences, while beginning 
in the natural world, point to immaterial – and meaningful – ideas in which we choose to 
believe. 
 However, while McEwan does show that meaning is possible without belief in 
God, he complicates the possibility of meaning in a number of ways. He explores the 
problem of arbitrarily deciding to “believe” in something – the difficulty of proving that 
anything is irreducible. This comes to light in Enduring Love (1997), in which the 
protagonist Joe chooses only to recognize certain types of love as legitimate. In Saturday 
(2005), aesthetic experiences provide meaning that is temporal, lasting only as long as a 
piece of music. Such experiences are also highly subjective, so that even if they are 
personally meaningful, such meaning does not translate collectively. The Children Act 
tells the story of Adam, who finds nothing worth living for when he loses his faith in God 
even though he has had a number of powerful aesthetic experiences. While McEwan is 
largely successful at showing how meaning is found within an atheistic framework – so 
successful that Hitchens points to him to prove the possibility of meaning without God – 
he also shows that there are significant challenges to finding meaning. 
In the chapters that follow, I argue that while McEwan shows that meaning is 
accessible within an atheistic framework, it can be found only in the context of belief in 
the irreducibility of ideas of love, beauty, and morality. McEwan can live a meaningful 
life as an atheist – but he cannot experience meaning as a total rationalist. Meaning 
requires that one arbitrarily assent to immaterial ideas because meaning is an immaterial 
idea itself, and this can lead to a number of complications because the arbitrary nature of 
? ??? ?
belief leads to subjective meaning that may not, it seems, satisfy everyone. But McEwan 
– who suggests that there is an entire non-empirical side to our common nature – sees no 
paradox. Within these confines – disbelief in God, but a belief in beauty – he gives a 
complex portrait of the modern atheist and the search for meaning. The New Atheists, it 
seems, are right to point toward McEwan – so long as they too are willing to assent to 
having faith, if not in God, then in love, beauty, and, ultimately, the possibility of a 
meaningful life. Without this sort of secular faith, McEwan’s novels show, nihilism is an 
inevitable outcome of atheism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? ??? ?
 
 
 
Chapter I 
Love 
 
“Finally he spoke the three simple words that no amount of bad art or bad 
faith can ever quite cheapen. She repeated them, with exactly the same 
slight emphasis on the second word, as though she had been the one to say 
them first. He had no religious belief, but it was impossible not to think of 
an invisible presence or witness in the room, and that these words spoken 
aloud were like signatures on an unseen contract.” – Ian McEwan, 
Atonement 
 
One of the most profound sources of meaning in McEwan’s novels is love. Even 
characters that are reductive in their thinking and tend to explain most emotional 
experiences through biological processes find meaning in love, especially when they 
experience grief. McEwan’s novels show that love has inherent, unjustified, and 
unexplained meaning for even the most rational and reductively minded characters. 
However, his novels also complicate the meaningfulness found in love by exposing a 
level of arbitrariness involved in the decision that love is meaningful. 
 Henry Perowne, the neurosurgeon protagonist of Saturday, tries to understand 
everything biologically. He considers himself a “professional reductionist” (281). Being a 
“professional” at taking a reductive viewpoint suggests that he has made a habit of 
looking at things materialistically, understanding them by their physical processes. At the 
beginning of Saturday, he awakens early in the morning. He thinks the pre-dawn 
euphoria he experiences might be the result of “a chemical accident while he slept—
? ??? ?
something like a spilled tray of drinks, prompting dopamine-like receptors to initiate a 
kindly cascade of intracellular events” (4). He sees a scientific cause for everything, 
including his own emotions. His reductionism extends to his thoughts about love as well. 
He thinks it is a “stroke of luck, that the woman he loves is also his wife” and an 
“accident of character” that he is not interested in other women, suggesting that love 
arises from random instances or luck – accidents that easily could have had different 
outcomes (39, 41). Such minimal and mechanical explanations reveal a reductive way of 
thinking about the world that would seem to limit the possibility for Perowne to 
appreciate love in a way that leads to meaning, which would require an assent to 
something that is inherently nonphysical and beyond scientific explanations.  
 However, when Perowne experiences grief, he does not look at love 
materialistically. When surgeries fail, he must confront his patients’ families with bad 
news. Such conversations are meaningful to Perowne because they are “a fundamental 
human exchange, as elemental in its way as love” (86). Even though Perowne touches 
brains “regularly,” he feels that they alone do not define what it means to be human. His 
use of the word “elemental” is significant; elements — carbon, oxygen, etc. — are the 
building blocks of all physical objects. In his textbook Chemistry, Kenneth Witten gives a 
helpful definition of element: “a substance that cannot be decomposed into simpler 
substances by chemical changes” (14). By suggesting that love and “fundamental human 
exchange[s]” are elemental, Perowne is comparing them to substances that are 
indivisible. Love cannot be reduced into something else or divided into smaller 
components. If we reduce love to a set of processes, a calculated movement of neurons, 
we are no longer talking about love, in the same way that if we talk about protons — 
? ??? ?
which make up carbon — we are no longer talking about carbon, but parts of it that could 
also be parts of any other element. Love is a combination of other elements (like a carbon 
atom, which is made up of atomic particles), but the moment that it is reduced to 
chemical reactions or a byproduct of natural selection, it ceases to be love anymore. 
Further analysis of love is not possible. There is a point when Perowne – the 
“professional reductionist” – stops reducing. Love is irreducible because it is elemental. 
Because it forms such an essential part of our common nature, it is inherently meaningful, 
and he does not question its meaningfulness further because he chooses to “believe” in it. 
By giving love “elemental” status, Perowne suggests that love cannot be reduced any 
further. 
 For Joe Rose in Enduring Love, a commitment to reductionism more deeply 
complicates meaning found in love than it does for Perowne. Joe’s ideas about love 
initially show a higher degree of reductionism than Perowne’s, but Joe thinks that 
reducing things can lead to greater meaning. In a discussion about why babies smile with 
his longtime partner Clarissa Mellon, a professor studying Keats, they disagree about 
how reducing something to biological processes affects its overall meaning. Joe thinks 
that understanding the analytical makeup of something makes it more interesting. “If we 
value a baby’s smile, why not contemplate its source?...That smile must be hard-wired, 
and for good evolutionary reasons” (75). He suggests that the smile was an evolutionary 
adaptation; smiling “babies who could not yet speak got more [love] for themselves” 
(75). Clarissa critiques his position, saying his ideas are “rationalism gone berserk” and 
“the new fundamentalism” (74).  The result of Joe’s neo-Darwinism is that “[e]verything 
was being stripped down…and some larger meaning was lost” (75). Even if Joe were to 
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discover new evolutionary adaptations, Clarissa does not think that Joe’s scientific 
explanations lead to more meaning. Instead, she believes that “[t]he truth of that smile 
was in the eye and heart of the parent, and in the unfolding love that only had meaning 
though time” (75). Clarissa thinks that love can have meaning only when it is not 
reduced; breaking it down into biological processes like Joe does destroys it.  
 However, Clarissa does not seem to be opposed to using science to understand 
things. Instead, her disagreement emerges when science alone is used to explain 
something. Similarly to Socrates as he is described in the Phaedo, she thinks that natural 
understandings alone eliminate the possibility of meaning. Clarissa thinks that Joe’s 
reductionism loses important meaning, saying that “There was nothing wrong in 
analyzing the bits, but it was easy to lose sight of the whole” (75). The bits cannot make 
the whole – the analytical relationships of the things that make up love will never be love. 
Clarissa, like Perowne, thinks of love as something elemental.  
 Joe responds by suggesting that wonder makes his position more meaningful. He 
thinks that Clarissa has taken the viewpoint of Keats, who was an “obscurantist, who 
thought science was robbing the world of wonder when the opposite was the case” (75). 
Jonathan Greenberg in his article “Why Can’t Biologists Read Poetry?” suggests that 
Keats’ position is “most famously articulated in ‘Lamia:’” 
“Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings,  
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,  
 Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine —  
Unweave a rainbow.” (Keats 924) 
 
Joe, finding meaning in reductive explanations, would disagree with Keats’ poem. For 
him, if the rainbow is “unwoven,” its unweaving leads to more wonder. In the debate 
between Joe and Clarissa, the “unweaving” is, of course, not about rainbow but an 
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“infant’s smile.” For Clarissa, the “truth” of the smile is in the relationship that it 
signifies — infant and parent — and the relationship is founded in irreducible love. Joe 
seeks wonder in its evolutionary lineage; Clarissa seeks love. Even if Joe is not a total 
materialist – he does not try to think about why the evolutionary history of the smile leads 
to wonder, but enjoys the experience of wonder without breaking it down further – he 
does reduce love so that he is no longer talking about love, missing the larger meaning 
that Clarissa seeks.  
McEwan complicates meaning rooted in love by making the conflict in Enduring 
Love center around a man, Parry, who falls in love with Joe and begins to stalk him. In 
this situation, Joe reduces and then delegitimizes Parry’s love. After several unnerving 
situations with Parry, Joe realizes that he suffers from de Clerambault’s syndrome (in 
which Parry is obsessed with Joe, thinking that Joe is in love with him). Being able to 
give a mechanistic explanation for Parry’s love comforts Joe, who thinks, “There was 
research to follow through now, and I knew exactly where to start. A syndrome was a 
framework of prediction, and it offered a kind of comfort” (134). Parry’s love for Joe is 
not considered legitimate by anyone in the novel because of its pathological nature. In 
their study, “Erotomania Revisited,” Dr. Harold W. Jordan et al. name different possible 
causes for the syndrome, including “a neuroscientific basis, in which the disorder is 
actually a form of schizophrenia with a neurochemical imbalance,” genetics, 
psychodymanic formulations, and other “environmental, psychological, pharmacological 
and physiological factors” (788). Parry’s love is reduced to its biological factors, and 
when it is reduced, it no longer is considered meaningful. Reducing Parry’s love brings 
Joe comfort; Joe thinks that if he understands the pathology, he will be able to make 
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Parry stop stalking him. 
Joe reduces Parry’s love to biology for a different reason than that for which he 
reduces the baby’s smile. When Joe thinks about the smile, a layered understanding 
including its evolutionary history makes the smile and its relationship to the concept of 
love more interesting and wonderful to him. When Joe thinks about Parry’s love, the 
reductive explanations relieve him. Reductive explanations make Parry’s love less 
meaningful – he is suffering from a mental illness, not experiencing real love. When love 
is most clearly the result of biochemical processes, Joe discounts it as real love. For the 
baby’s smile, scientific explanations make it more meaningful; for Parry’s love, they do 
the opposite. However, there seems to be no definite way to ascertain which sort of love 
is pathological and which is real (and deserves a response) other than external contexts 
for it. Joe thinks about the psychologist who named de Clerambault syndrome after 
encountering a patient with it: 
 “It was a simple idea, really, but a man who had a theory about 
pathological love and who had given his name to it, like a bridegroom at 
the altar, must surely reveal, even if unwittingly, the nature of love itself. 
For there to be a pathology, there had to be a lurking concept of health. De 
Clerambault’s syndrome was a dark, distorting mirror that reflected and 
parodied a brighter world of lovers whose reckless abandon to their cause 
was sane…” (137). 
 
If the love is reciprocated (lovers is plural), then it is acceptable. Perhaps if Joe had felt 
the same way about Parry, what might be read as a symptom in Parry would instead be 
regarded as a natural affection. The distinction between love and a mental illness is vague 
because an illness would be a reduction of the initial feeling of love, turning it into 
something else. Here, a materialistic account of love does not bring more meaning in the 
same way that “unweaving the rainbow” brought wonder. Instead, reducing it makes it 
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meaningless. 
 This arbitrariness is compounded by the fact that, occasionally, Joe chooses not to 
reduce love. He muses on Parry’s condition to think more clearly about his own problems 
in his relationship with Clarissa: “…what could I learn about Parry that would restore me 
to Clarissa?” (137). Even as Joe is confronted with the fact that love can be a mere 
biological process – a biological process that can go wrong – he does not reduce his own 
feelings about Clarissa to chemical mechanisms. He thinks about Parry’s love – which he 
designates a pathology – to understand his love for Clarissa. At the same time, his love 
for Clarissa is being unreciprocated (partially because of Joe’s “obsession” with Parry), 
and this could easily turn into a sort of pathological problem. In fact, Joe goes through 
Clarissa’s things, searching for some evidence of her unfaithfulness when there is none. 
Joe does not analyze his feelings for Clarissa how he looked at a baby’s smile or Parry. 
Instead, he responds to them solely on how they make him feel, turning away from his 
reductive tendencies to focus instead on emotion. 
Another limit to Joe’s reductionism comes to light when he sees Jean, the widow 
of John Logan, a man who died while trying to save a boy in a hot air balloon accident. In 
her home with her two children, he is confronted with her grief. Like Perowne telling his 
patients’ families bad news, an experience with the finitude of life makes him realize 
what its essential, irreducible elements are: 
“What I saw in Jean’s grief reduced my own situation to uncomplicated 
elements, to a periodic table of simple good sense: when it’s gone, you’ll 
know what a gift love was. You’ll suffer like this. So go back and fight to 
keep it. Everything else, Parry included, is irrelevant.” (122) 
 
For all of his reductionism, an encounter with someone who is experiencing loss makes 
Joe think that love is one of the most elemental parts of life. It forms a part of the 
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“periodic table of simple good sense” – it needs no more justification than that it belongs 
on the periodic table, as irreducible and indispensible to life as the element carbon. It is 
elemental for Joe in the same way that it is for Perowne: irreducible. 
These two novels show that a level of arbitrariness – belief – is involved in 
understanding love. There is no definite line between love as a pathology and love as a 
meaningful emotion, and reducing love can lead to both more meaning and 
meaninglessness. The concept of love is complicated consistently until these characters 
experience death. When they are confronted with grief, love immediately becomes 
something real. It becomes an elemental, irreducible part of existence, and the 
transformation from an object of study to an object of belief is so immediate that neither 
character notices it. When it reaches this elemental status – when we no longer reduce it 
further – it becomes meaningful, not because it leads to wonder, is connected to god, or is 
an interesting object of study: It simply has inherent, unquestioned meaning. But the 
process of deciding that love is elemental, and when it is elemental, is arbitrary and can 
complicate the meaning that love produces because when love is meaningful is not 
always mutually agreed upon. There is no absolute standard for understanding when love 
counts and when it does not, and because of this, the meaning produced from the 
experience of love must be believed in – there must be some arbitrary decision that a 
certain instance of love is valuable and meaningful.  
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Chapter II 
Beauty in Art 
 
 “Music,” George said with a large gesture of his arm, “is a sacred art.” – 
Ian McEwan, “Psychopolis”  
 
Beauty, like love, has inherent meaning for many of McEwan’s characters. It can be 
experienced in a variety of ways – literature, music, and visual art – and, like love, it does 
not have to be analyzed any further. An experience of beauty through art remains just 
that: a meaningful encounter unreduced by evolutionary explanations or biochemical 
processes. However, McEwan’s novels also complicate, as they do for love, how beauty 
can give meaning by suggesting that there is a level of arbitrariness involved in aesthetic 
perception and by drawing on scientific understandings of our reactions to beauty. 
 In Saturday, when Baxter, a man suffering from Huntington’s disease, intrudes 
into Perowne’s home and threatens to rape his daughter, Daisy, the beauty of a poem 
catalyzes a change of heart. Daisy recites Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach,” and Baxter 
transforms from a “lord of terror to [an] amazed admirer” (232). Affected by the poem, 
he tells Daisy to get dressed “as though her nakedness was her own strange idea” (232). 
The poem alienates Baxter from his previous plans and ideas so that they seem “strange” 
even to himself. Baxter transforms from being nihilistic – thinking that hurting someone 
else does not matter – to having hope. Beauty is especially powerful because it allows 
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Baxter to hope in spite of his genetic disease and his (presumed) lack of religion. 
Baxter’s disease would seem to lead to hopelessness. His genetic mutation — 
“significantly more than forty CAG repeats in the middle of an obscure gene on 
chromosome four”  — prescribes for him an early and painful death (93).  Baxter’s fate is 
not going to be changed by “love, drugs, Bible classes or prison sentencing” (217). There 
is nothing that can “shift him from his course. It’s spelled out in fragile proteins, but it 
could be carved in stone, or tempered steel” (217). This is, as Perowne remarks, 
“biological determinism in its purest form,” reminding Perowne of the Biblical phrase “It 
is written” (93). Nothing can change the fact that Huntington’s disease will lead to his 
early death. Thus, the scientific advances that allow Baxter to understand his condition 
are the same ones that force him to recognize the hopelessness of his own condition. He 
is ineluctably bound to the genes that will lead to his early death.  
 The poem that Baxter listens to, “Dover Beach,” suggests that the decline of 
religion is another cause for hopelessness. This aspect of the poem is relevant to Baxter 
because Saturday portrays a world in which at least part of the poem is true: faith has 
“retreated.” Baxter does not seem to be religious in any way, Perowne “balks at the 
mention of a sea of faith,” and his son Theo is a part of a “sincerely godless generation” 
in which “[t]here’s no entity for him to doubt” (221, 32). Published eight years after 
Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1867, “Dover Beach” describes what religion used to be 
like: 
“The Sea of Faith 
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore 
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.” 
 
Religion was profuse and “full,” but now, at the height of the Industrial Revolution, the 
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speaker says:  
“But now I only hear  
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, 
Retreating, to the breath 
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear 
And naked shingles of the world.”  
 
Faith has “withdrawn” — religion has declined. God has been replaced by natural 
selection and other natural laws. The poem suggests that without a god, while gaining a 
scientific understanding of ourselves, we have lost something:  
“As, love, let us be true  
To one another! For the world, which seems  
To lie before us like a land of dreams,  
So various, so beautiful, so new,  
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,  
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain…” 
 
Without faith the world only “seems” to be “so various, so beautiful, so new.” These 
things are illusions; in this faithless new world, there is no “joy, nor love, nor light,/Nor 
certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain.” Without faith, the speaker does not know how 
these things will continue to exist. He looks to his “love” and wants them, as a couple, to 
“be true/To one another!” despite this new vision of the world. Perhaps he sees 
individual, personalized relationships as giving meaning in this new world, but how this 
is possible without love is uncertain. His vision for the future remains bleak, even if 
interpersonal relationships continue: 
“And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night.” 
 
The poem directly ties the loss of faith to the loss of hope. Now, all that remains is an 
“eternal note of sadness,” “a darkling plain” filled with “ignorant armies.” Perowne 
thinks that “[t]he plea to be true to one another sounds hopeless” (230).  Even the hope 
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that might remain in human connections is undermined by the conditions of the world 
that the speaker attributes to the world’s newfound faithlessness. 
However, Baxter’s experience with the poem suggests that beauty overcomes the 
hopelessness of his genetics and godlessness by giving meaning through aesthetic 
experience. He responds to the poem — which suggests that the world only seems to 
have beauty — by exclaiming, “It’s beautiful!” and he “appears suddenly elated” (230). 
Perowne thinks that the poem “reminded [Baxter] how much he wanted to live” and 
“touched off in Baxter a yearning he could barely begin to describe” (288). An 
experience of beauty effected a change in Baxter because it made him think that his life – 
if he could experience such beauty – could be meaningful. In her article “Fact and 
Artefact,” Deryn Rees-Jones writes, “Arnold’s poem, it appears, has done all that Arnold 
wants a poem to do. It has a kind of moral force. In McEwan’s novel it performs an 
‘awakening,’ albeit an awakening of a mind in a state of deterioration, which it 
temporarily chastens, calms and satisfies” (335). It is the beauty that “awakens” Baxter, 
turning him away from nihilism.  
Beauty stops Baxter’s nihilistic intentions (planning to rape Daisy) by 
“awakening” him to hope that allows him to envision the possibility of another, less 
painful, future for himself. In her article “Ethics, Knowledge, and the Need for Beauty,” 
Kathleen Wall writes, “Daisy’s recitation of ‘Dover Beach’…reveals how beauty can 
disarm anger and incite hope” (761).  This is not a naïve hope; Baxter does not suddenly 
believe for miraculous recoding of his genes; the poem has not made him forget or 
question that his Huntington’s disease will progress. Instead, he expresses a hope in 
something that Perowne can help him achieve: an easier, less painful death. Because this 
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is what Baxter puts hope in — instead of miraculous healing — his hope is not naïve or 
due to ephemeral forgetfulness of his condition. He is fully cognizant of both of these 
things and still chooses to have hope. 
The planning that Baxter did to intrude into Perowne’s home suggests that the 
poem alone was responsible for giving Baxter hope. The poem and its beauty created 
hope. Asking Perowne about going on a clinical trial that might prolong his life was not 
Baxter’s original intention for coming to Perowne’s home; he had probably not intended 
to rape his daughter and then ask for medical help. While Baxter’s initial confrontation 
with Perowne – they meet in the morning when Perowne’s car collides with Baxter’s – 
does suggest that he has the capacity for some hope, this hope is short lived compared to 
the effect of the poem. When he gets out of his car to speak to Baxter after the accident, 
Perowne recognizes “a muscular restlessness” in his face and, to avoid “a thorough 
beating” by Baxter and his friends, questions Baxter about his father (facial tremors are a 
symptom of Huntington’s disease, which is genetic) (93). This disarms Baxter; after 
making his friends leave him alone with Perowne, his “agitated features [display] a 
sudden avidity, a hunger for information, or hope” (97). When Perowne offers to help 
Baxter — more out of self-interest in avoiding a beating than genuine concern — he 
begins to ask questions and express hope, not necessarily of a cure, but of his death being 
“easier” (97). This initial expression of hope, however, does not last. He decides to get 
back at Perowne that night; his intrusion was not a spur of the moment plan (Perowne 
thinks that he sees Baxter’s red car following him throughout the day). Nigel, Baxter’s 
accomplice, complains when Baxter changes his mind that “[he and Baxter] gone to all 
this trouble,” suggesting that they had intentionally planned to come to Perowne’s home 
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(231). Thus, any residual hope Perowne provided Baxter at their initial confrontation 
disintegrated before Baxter entered his home. It was beauty, and not a predisposition for 
hope, that led to Baxter’s change of heart. 
In this situation, beauty became a conduit for meaning. Baxter’s response to 
thinking that his life was meaningful was to hope. “Baxter fell for the magic, he was 
transfixed by it, and he was reminded how much he wanted to live” (288). The fleeting 
experience of beauty makes the world appear orderly, giving Baxter a basis for hope. 
Hope is, according to the OED, “the expectation of something desired; desire combined 
with expectation.” Order is essential to hope because hope implies, as the OED suggests, 
that something can be expected. Expectations are not random but built on previous 
experience. Hope would be irrational in a chaotic universe. In an orderly one, however, it 
would make sense to have hope for some things because orderliness in the universe 
would suggest that some hopes would be realized. Baxter experiences beauty, and he 
hopes. This happens without any acknowledgement of God, suggesting that atheism does 
not have to lead to nihilism. 
Even though it seems like the experience of beauty is what gives Baxter meaning, 
Perowne complicates the idea by repeatedly expressing incredulity that a “mere” poem 
could bring about a reaction. As Daisy reads the poem, Perowne thinks, “Could it happen, 
is it within the bounds of the real, that a mere poem of Daisy’s could precipitate a mood 
swing?” (229). Perowne immediately qualifies his statement with “is it within the bounds 
of the real?” (229). He grounds himself first in what he can know empirically; he wants 
an explanation that makes sense to him. He, once called a “gradgrind” by Daisy, calls 
“Dover Beach” a “mere poem” (299). The OED defines mere as “having no greater 
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extent, range, value, power or importance than the designation implies; that is barely or 
only what it is said to be.” Perowne uses the adjective reductively, not expecting the 
poem to have any function. However, he realizes that poetry did serve a purpose, at least 
for them: “Who would have thought that learning poems by heart for pocket money 
would turn out to be so useful?” (241). Perowne concedes that the poem “[threw] the 
switch on a sudden mood change” (288). He seems to have decided that it was the poem 
that altered Baxter’s mood, or, at least, that Baxter’s mood would not have been altered 
without the poem. However, the “spell” is cast only on “one man” (288). Perowne is 
unaffected by the poem; the experience of beauty is subjective. Indeed, “Baxter heard 
what Henry never has, and probably never will, despite all Daisy’s attempts to educate 
him” (288). Perowne’s suspicion that the poem might not be a source of transformative 
beauty suggests that Baxter’s experience is very subjective. 
Perowne’s incredulity about the poem leads him to suggest that Baxter’s reaction 
has a biochemical explanation that complicates the meaning found in beauty. The disease 
that Baxter is trying to have hope against provides the broken mechanism – a mood 
swing – that allows him to have hope in the first place. The poem only “precipitates a 
mood swing” (229). The mood swing Baxter has could have also made him more violent, 
and other things cause mood swings for Baxter in the novel. At their first confrontation, 
Baxter’s mood changes when he realizes Perowne has “cheated [him] of a little violence 
and the exercise of a little power” (99). Baxter switches from having hope to 
concentrating on revenge. Perowne realizes that Baxter’s instability complicates the idea 
that the poem alone could have brought out a change in Baxter because of his 
predisposition to swift mood changes. While Perowne does not think that the poem could 
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be solely responsible for saving Daisy, it might have hastened the coming of a mood 
swing – but that is all that it does. Even if it is possible for beauty to be so meaningful 
that it catalyzes a total transformation, there are so many confounding variables in 
Baxter’s situation that Perowne does not give the poem’s beauty much of the credit for 
changing Baxter’s mood. 
Because of the instability of moods that is a symptom of Huntington’s disease, 
Perowne also worries about the transience of the mood swing, further questioning the 
power of beauty to give lasting meaning. “Henry worries that a prompt from Nigel, a 
reminder of the purpose of the visit, could effect another mood swing, a revision” (230). 
Perowne knows how volatile the mood swings are; this too makes the effect of the poem 
seem less powerful because it does not last very long. “[Baxter’s] state of mind is so 
deliberately poised, easily disturbed” (231). Baxter’s state of mind is so fragile that “even 
a mere poem” could affect it. However, when Nigel reminds Baxter of his purpose – “I’ll 
take the knife while you do the business” – Baxter is still thinking about the poem. Even 
when Nigel persists – “Don’t be a cunt,” he says, and then, “I can’t believe it! We gone to 
all this trouble!” Baxter remains transfixed (231). There has been time for his mood to 
change and Nigel tries to convince Baxter to return to the plan, but Baxter does not revert 
to his original state. Even if Perowne does not yet recognize it, the poem might have had 
a more profound effect on Baxter than merely “precipitating a mood swing” (230). 
However, Perowne continues to describe Baxter in clinical terms. When Baxter gets 
excited about the poem, Perowne observes, “[h]e’s becoming manic” (232). Perowne sees 
Baxter’s prolonged euphoria not as a result of the poem’s beauty, but instead a symptom 
of Baxter’s disease. His behavior is typical and expected in light of how Huntington’s 
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disease damages the brain. “Powerful feelings have obliterated the memory. In the 
sudden emotional rush of his mood swing, he inhabits the confining bright spotlight or 
the present” (232). Perowne does not deny that the poem incited a “sudden emotional 
rush,” but he also suggests that these feelings persist because of a biochemical error. 
Perowne consistently undermines the power of beauty, suggesting that Baxter’s response 
was mechanistic. 
In this example, beauty works in a similar way that love did. An experience of 
beauty leads to meaning for Baxter; in his case, beauty gives him hope. But beauty 
becomes meaningless if Baxter’s perception of it and reaction afterward can be reduced 
to a mechanism. Perowne reduces Baxter’s response to beauty to the symptom of an 
illness. If Perowne is right, the disease that destines Baxter to a terrible death is the same 
one that allows him to experience hope. Beauty becomes meaningless. However, if 
Baxter’s response is something more than a symptom of an illness, beauty must have 
inherent value that gave him meaning. If beauty is irreducible – like love – its value 
becomes infinite because it suggests that life is meaningful in spite of both our finitude 
(Baxter’s genetics) and the absence of a god or transcendent order. 
While Perowne does try to reductively explain away Baxter’s reaction to the 
beauty of the poem, his reaction may be less in response to beauty itself as to the source 
of beauty – literature. His appreciation of beauty in other things seems to indicate that he 
does see beauty as a powerful, inherently meaningful idea, even if he does not experience 
it through literature. He is convinced that “that fiction is too humanly flawed, too 
sprawling and hit-and-miss to inspire uncomplicated wonder at the magnificence of 
human ingenuity, of the impossible dazzlingly achieved” (67). While he thinks that 
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literature is “too humanly flawed,” other things can give an experience of beauty, of “the 
impossible dazzlingly achieved.” Things immediately associated with humans are flawed; 
Perowne thinks, “Work that you cannot begin to imagine achieving yourself, that displays 
a ruthless, nearly inhuman element of self-enclosed perfection—this is his idea of genius” 
(177). Perowne is stressing the distance from humanity required to meet his standard of 
great art: an “inhuman” element. Because he has decided that literature does not meet this 
standard – and it does seem it impossible for an art form that reveals our “common 
nature” as humans, as McEwan says that it does, to be inhuman – he does not see how 
Baxter could perceive beauty through it.  
However, Perowne does have experiences of beauty – moments that “inspire 
uncomplicated wonder” and seem “inhuman” – that suggest that he can find inherent 
meaning in beauty (67). He does not reduce or explain away his experience of beauty as 
he does with Baxter and the poem, but instead feels like it has inherent meaning. He 
mentions Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and Schubert, as “the usual suspects,” composers 
whose music gives this experience (68). However, Perowne does question whether 
listening to the blues can be a meaningful experience: “…is there a lifetime’s satisfaction 
in twelve bars of three obvious chords?” (27). This musical structure of the blues might 
be “a microcosm giving you the whole world,” because its variations – “the deviation, the 
unexpected turn against the grain” – make it interesting, but Perowne wonders about “the 
limits of the form” (27). That Perowne distinguishes “Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and 
Schubert” from hundreds of other musicians and composers suggests that their music has 
something different about it, allowing for such a distinction. He does not see music itself 
as inherently beautiful (otherwise, all music would be), but certain characteristics about it 
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can lead to beauty that is inherently meaningful.  
Perowne doubts that the blues will give the same experience as classical music; 
however, he has a meaningful aesthetic experience when he listens to his son Theo play. 
When he visits Theo’s practice for his band Blue Rider, he initially is resistant, wishing to 
instead “be at home with a Mozart trio on the hi-fi, and a glass of icy white wine” (170). 
He does not expect to hear anything different in the music; he is not expecting a moment 
of beauty or great emotion. However, Perowne experiences beauty in an unexpected way 
when he watches Theo’s band because the music, like that of Bach, has an inhuman 
element to it. He is surprised when he finds the blues to be beautiful, having the level of 
“self-enclosed perfection” that leads to meaning. Perowne’s initial resistance “doesn’t 
hold out for long” because the song begins to use uncommon variations. As the 
musicians’ “exuberance and expertise” wins him over, Perowne discovers that “the song 
is not in the usual pattern of a twelve-bar blues” (170). Previously, Perowne thought that 
variations within the form made a song interesting. This experience is different: There is 
variation of the form itself, which produces “pleasure,” revealing “the world in a grain of 
sand” (26). The musicians “touch something sweeter than they’re ever found before in 
rehearsals or performance, beyond merely collaborative or technically proficient, [and] 
their expression becomes as easy and graceful as friendship or love” (176). What the 
“touch” is something like beauty; it cannot be reduced to “collaboration” or technical 
“proficiency,” and is only described as something “beyond” both of these things.  
Perowne appreciates Theo’s music because, surprising Perowne, it has an 
“inhuman” element to it. Instead of showing something new about the world, providing a 
variation on a common theme, the melody is “unworldly” as it “rises and falls in 
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semitones” (175). Like the music of Bach or Mozart that Perowne appreciates, there is 
something inhuman – “unworldly” – about Theo’s Blues, and it draws Perowne in. The 
unfamiliarity makes their piece interesting. Theo and his band member Chas sing in “a 
close, strange harmony” (170). At the end, “Theo and Chas drift back to centre stage to 
sing their unearthly chorus” (177). The chorus – like the melody – is “unearthly,” 
suggesting that it reveals something beyond the world itself about it. The effect on 
Perowne is remarkable: “he feels lifted up, right high across the counter. He doesn’t want 
the song to end” (177). The piece has something about it that is “unworldly” and 
“unearthly” and because of this, against Perowne’s expectations, it becomes meaningful.   
For Perowne, this experience of something “inhuman” – a character of something 
“dazzlingly achieved” – is an encounter with beauty. The beauty of the music makes the 
world appear orderly, but this happens only when the music itself uses “unworldly” 
melodies. Music gives Perowne an experience of “a coherent world, everything fitting at 
last.” Like the effect of the poem on Baxter, an experience of order – “a coherent world” 
– leads to hope. The music gives him hope for community in the same way that it gave 
Baxter hope for his future: “….only in music, and only on rare occasions, does the curtain 
actually lift on this dream of community, and it’s tantalizingly conjured, before fading 
away with the last notes” (176). It gives him a vision of something better, a hopeful idea 
of what the future might be like.  
While the hope that Perowne finds in music leads him to the conclusion that “at 
the heart of the blues is…a strange and worldly joy,” meaning is complicated by its 
transience and subjectivity (28). Like Baxter’s response to the poem in which “one man” 
heard its magic, when music unifies people, “no one can ever agree when it’s 
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happening.” The sense of community that music gives is only “tantalizingly conjured,” 
ending when the music does. But the transience of it seems not to negate its profound 
effect on Perowne. The beauty of the music – when everything comes together – leads to 
meaning for Perowne that he does not reduce, as he does for Baxter’s encounter, to 
chemical reactions.  
In The Children Act, when Fiona accompanies her coworker Mark, a tenor, at a 
party, they experience the “inhuman beauty” of music that Theo’s band does in Saturday. 
They experience the same transient meaning during their performance of Berlioz’s setting 
of “Villanelle.” “The tenor’s entry was perfect, and within a few bars they were locked 
into a unity of purpose they had rarely touched in rehearsal, no longer concentrating on 
simply getting things right, but able to dissolve into the music without effort” (205). They 
have a “unity of purpose,” that matches what happens when Theo’s band plays. There is 
something beyond the physical that these groups achieve. Fiona and Mark’s performance 
comes naturally: “It was as if she and Mark were being borne easily downstream on a 
current of notes” (206). The ease of performance, as it did for Blue Rider, allows them to 
make music that, like Schubert or Beethoven’s, becomes otherwordly. “Together, she and 
Mark entered the horizonless hyperspace of music-making, beyond time and purpose. 
She was only faintly aware that something waited for her in return, for it lay far below 
her, an alien speck on a familiar landscape” (206). The world itself seems less real than 
the music. This is especially significant because what is “waiting for her in return” is the 
news of Adam’s death, which someone tells her about moments before she walks 
onstage. She is shocked, but music is so powerful that it removes her from this situation. 
The inhuman beauty that it provided overshadowed even Adam’s death. 
? ??? ?
These encounters with poetry and music suggest that meaning can come through 
experiences of beauty. However, McEwan does not naively point to art as a solution for 
meaninglessness. The transience of meaning in art and questions of why we respond to it 
in the first place (are our responses meaningful if they are mechanized?) force us to 
recognize the same thread of arbitrariness runs through our responses to love. Some 
responses to beauty are reduced to biochemical processes (as Perowne does to Baxter’s 
reaction to the poem) and some are not (such as Perowne’s experience with the blues). 
However, the experiences of beauty do seem to be inherently meaningful to the 
characters. They are able to achieve meaningfulness without any recourse to the divine; 
such meaning appears to be satisfying for Perowne, Joe, and Fiona.  
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Chapter III 
Wonder in Science 
 
The world is also full of wonders, which is why I’m foolishly in love with 
it. – Ian McEwan, Nutshell 
 
Wonder in the natural world is accompanied by the same feelings of inherent meaning 
that characterize love and beauty. Ideas like the complexity and fragility of the brain, the 
progression of natural selection, and the intricacy of DNA have the most meaning not in 
light of their veracity, but the wonder that they inspire. Each of these — and other 
scientific ideas — adds meaning to characters’ lives because they suggest that the world 
is orderly.  
However, as we have seen for love and beauty in art, using science to create 
meaning has its own set of difficulties. Finding wonder in science can be subject to, as 
Jonathan Greenberg has noted, “recursivity.” In a discussion of motivations in Enduring 
Love, he suggests, “[The protagonist’s] Darwinism…reduces human motives to an 
unconscious and biological calculus” (Greenberg 100, 102). If our motives are 
predetermined, then our actions and feelings might also be determined by the series of 
chemical reactions that preceded them. If Darwinism does lead to a sort of biological 
reductionism, as Greenberg suggests, then we can only be awed by science while being 
reminded that it is because of chemical reactions — a “biological calculus” — that we 
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have emotional responses at all. Any feeling of meaningfulness, and the impulse that 
drives us to seek meaning, would be a purely mechanistic process. Thus, scientific 
knowledge, while enabling feelings of meaningfulness, also brings into question whether 
or not meaning exists as anything other than a product of inflexible genetic pre-
programming. Such circularity complicates the idea of using science as a foundation for 
meaningful aesthetic experience. As McEwan writes in his essay “End of the World 
Blues,” which was anthologized in Christopher Hitchens’ The Portable Atheist,  
“I would argue that [scientific] knowledge has a beauty of its own and it 
can be terrifying. We are barely beginning to grasp the implications of 
what we have relatively recently learned…Among other things we have 
learned that our planet is a minute speck in an inconceivably vast cosmos; 
that our species has existed for a tiny fraction of the history of the earth; 
that humans are primates; that the mind is the activity of an organ than 
runs by physiological processes….” (364) 
 
Science can be beautiful and incite wonder, but it is the same source of beauty that 
reminds us of how we fit into an overall, materialistic order that, while testifying to our 
uniqueness, reminds us of our common origins with the rest of the universe and the 
mechanistic processes from which everything — including ourselves — emerged.  
Even though Perowne continually claims to be a reductionist, descriptions of his 
work suggest that he is deeply invested in the wonder that science allows him to 
experience. When Perowne says that he “regularly penetrates the skull,” the adverb 
reduces his job — which requires years of training and has been met with “modest 
success” only recently — to something routine, almost mundane (281). His referring to 
the “skull,” instead of the brain, is also reductive. The brain, not the skull, is the “most 
complex object in the known universe” (86). By emphasizing his work on the less 
complex organ — bone — Perowne makes his work seem less remarkable than it actually 
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is. He has “chosen brains because they were more interesting than bladders or knee 
knots,” a reductive reason for his choice of profession; however, whenever he 
experienced the beauty of neurosurgery, “his ambition became a matter of deep desire” 
(46). He tells the story of a patient, his future wife, and her operation that struck him as 
beautiful — “[the patient’s] particularly beautiful face was reassembled without a single 
disfiguring mark.” That something so complicated could be done to the brain – she has a 
tumor removed from her pituitary gland – without leaving any outward mark left 
Perowne with “excitement about the future and impatient to acquire the skills” (46). Such 
excitement seems to have lasted him throughout his career. “[O]perating never wearies 
him…absorbed by the vivid foreshortening of the operating microscope as he follows a 
corridor to a desired site, he experiences a superhuman capacity, more like a craving, for 
work” (10). Instead of seeing his job as a neurosurgeon as a means to an end — making 
money, “drilling” into the skull — he sees it as something that adds meaning to his life 
beyond its teleological purpose because it allows him to experience beauty — and do 
beautiful work — on a daily basis. Indeed, performing neurosurgery is so effective at 
satisfying Perowne that he “craves” it (10).  
While Perowne finds surgical procedures beautiful for their swiftness and 
efficacy, he also sees great beauty in the brain because it is so fragile. He describes his 
work with the precise detail that we would expect from a consultant neurosurgeon, but he 
repeatedly emphasizes the beauty of the brain by giving florid descriptions of fragile 
brain structures in addition to their Latin anatomical terms. Despite his self-professed 
literary philistinism, Perowne uses figurative language when describing the brain, 
especially when remarking on its fragility (67).  For example, the arachnoid is “that 
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gossamer covering of the brain through which he routinely cuts. The grandeur.” (55). 
Even though Perowne sees the arachnoid often — cutting it “routinely” — he has not 
been desensitized to its beauty. He calls it “gossamer,” a word first used to describe a 
“fine filmy substance, consisting of cobwebs, spun by small spiders, which is seen 
floating in the air in calm weather” (OED). The arachnoid is as fragile as the silky thread 
of a spider web. That something so fragile has evolved recalls to him the final lines of 
Darwin’s Origin of Species, suggesting that the fragility of the structure contributes to 
“the grandeur;” the fragility itself testifies to its beauty. “There is grandeur in this view of 
life,” Darwin writes, “…from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and 
most wonderful have been and are being, evolved” (Darwin 478). The beauty of the 
arachnoid is a testament to the beautiful process that produced it, a reminder that there is 
“grandeur” in a view of life that relies not on a god speaking things into existence 
immediately, but a long and natural process of evolution.  
In another operation, seeing the fragility of the tentorium makes Perowne describe 
it with figurative language, suggesting that it has so much meaning for Perowne that he 
cannot express what he feels without using art. Being able to identify the tentorium 
suffices for a neurosurgeon; no thoughts about its beauty are particularly important to 
completing an operation. However, Perowne describes it as “a pale delicate structure of 
beauty, like the little whirl of a veiled dancer, where the dura is gathered and parted 
again” (9).  Perowne begins by calling the structure “pale” and “delicate” — ideas that 
are probably important for neurosurgeons to identify the thin, flesh-colored sheet of 
tissue — but then calls it a “structure of beauty.” Then Perowne makes an analogy to two 
previously unrelated things, much like a poet. He sees the tentorium as something in 
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motion (a dancer), and — perhaps most significantly — invokes a form of art (dance) in 
the description. In addition, he had already mentioned that the tentorium was “delicate,” 
but comparing it to a “veil,” “whril[ing]” around a dancer emphasizes the fragility of the 
structure because veils are usually made of very thin, delicate, and translucent fabric. 
Even though there are naturalistic reasons why the arachnoid or tentorium had to take this 
form in order to function well, Perowne does not reduce their fragility by a naturalistic 
explanation. Instead, fragility is beautiful to Perowne because it shows how ordered the 
brain is; if something very tiny goes wrong, the brain will not function properly.  
 Near the end of the novel, the connection between beauty and fragility climaxes, 
showing that regardless of how fragile the brain is, Perowne will always find it beautiful. 
As he tries to distract Baxter after he has listened to the poem and become hopeful, 
Perowne tries to pass off a neurological research paper on a treatment for Parkinson’s 
disease as a clinical trial for patients with Huntington’s disease. “The globus pallidus, the 
pale globe, is a rather beautiful thing, deep in the basal ganglia, one of the oldest parts of 
the corpus striatum,” he says (235). Even though he is nervous — “[h]is voice quavers, as 
a liar’s might” — he does not lose his admiration for the beauty of brain, calling the basal 
ganglia a “rather beautiful thing” (235). Perowne’s response to beauty – wonder – seems 
almost innate; no amount of emotional distress can diminish it, and, importantly, neither 
can instances of its failure. The basal ganglia is a collection of structures that includes the 
corpus striatum, and the corpus striatum includes the globus pallidus. All of these 
structures work to enable movement and present abnormalities in patients with both 
Parkinson’s and Huntington’s disease. Huntington’s disease attacks neurons in the brain, 
and, as F. O. Walker, MD, a professor in the department of neurology at Wake Forest 
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University, observes, “Striatal medium spiny neurons are the most vulnerable” (219). 
These specific neurons are directly connected to the globus pallidus. When Perowne talks 
about the globus pallidus, he is referring to the specific part of the brain that is most 
vulnerable to Baxter’s disease. He even remarks on its beauty to Baxter, whose condition 
demonstrates “…how the brilliant machinery is undone by the tiniest of faulty cogs, the 
insidious whisper of ruin, a single bad idea lodged in every cell, on every chromosome 
four” (94). While the “machinery” is brilliant, it can be destroyed by something “tiny,” a 
“whisper” and a “single bad idea.” Its beauty does not save it from being extremely 
fragile. Even though Perowne knows this and has fragility of this specific brain part 
manifested in front of him —manifested and wielding a knife — he still finds the globus 
pallidus to be beautiful. A manifestation of its fragility does not make the brain any less 
beautiful for Perowne. Instead, the fragility testifies to the order of the brain, and such 
order is beautiful. The beauty of the brain becomes inherently meaningful; Perowne does 
not reduce it further and instead regards it with unmitigated wonder.  
Perowne thinks that his work has an intrinsic artistic quality that allows for a 
nexus between science and art, suggesting that the two are similar because they both 
provide experiences of beauty. He calls Mr. Whaley, the consultant when Perowne was in 
medical school, a “maestro” after he finishes an operation, neurosurgery to orchestral 
conducting (36). He describes himself as “something of a master in the art” of “[clipping] 
the neck of a middle cerebral artery aneurysm” (6). Calling himself a “master” makes 
him sound like a virtuoso; when we think of “great masters,” usually painters like 
Michelangelo or Raphael or composers like Beethoven come to mind. The technical 
language — “middle cerebral artery aneurysm” — highlights the deep level of precision 
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required of his work, which is not unlike the exacting nature of realistic painting or 
composing a sonata.  Later in the novel, he remarks on the “limits of the art….of 
neurosurgery as it stands today,” suggesting that neurosurgery itself is an art form (263). 
In another instance, Perowne compares poets to neurosurgeons. “But he understands how 
eminent poets, like senior consultants, live in a watchful, jealous world” (130).  All of 
these suggest a connection between science and art that leads to wonder and meaning.  
The final operation of the novel displays the deepest connection between science 
and art. In an interview with Zadie Smith for The Believer, McEwan called the moment 
when Perowne begins the surgery “a moment of artistic engagement.” While listening to 
a recording of the “Goldberg Variations,” Perowne 
 “…takes a sponge on a clamp and dips it in a bowl of Betadine solution. 
The tender, wistful Aria begins to unfold and spread, hesitantly at first, 
and makes the theatre seem even more spacious. At the very first stroke of 
sunflower yellow on pale skin, a familiar contentedness settles on Henry; 
it’s the pleasure of knowing precisely what’s he’s doing, of seeing the 
instruments arrayed on the trolley, of being with his firm in the muffled 
quiet of the theatre, the murmur of the air filtration, the sharper hiss of 
oxygen passing into the mask taped to Baxter’s face out of sight under the 
drapes, the clarity of the overhead lights.” (258) 
 
Perowne sounds like an artist beginning a painting. The “sponge on a clamp” works like a 
paintbrush, and the Betadine solution is described as “sunflower yellow.” Such a 
description seems unusual for an antiseptic, but “sunflower yellow” is a common shade 
of oil paint and brings to mind Van Gogh’s series Sunflowers. When Perowne begins to 
prepare the antiseptic on Baxter’s skin — which is “pale” like a blank canvas — he 
makes a “stroke.” The word stroke recalls a brushstroke, instead of a smear of antiseptic. 
The operating room is called a  “theatre,” which has the effect of making Perowne’s work 
seem like an artistic performance. Much like the studio of a painter, the operating room is 
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full of satisfying aesthetics. The “instruments arrayed on the trolley” and the “muffled 
quiet of the theatre” work together for Perowne to experience “a familiar contentedness.” 
All of these suggest that both artistic and scientific elements are working together to 
produce something deeply meaningful: an aesthetic experience of beauty. 
 Artistic and scientific elements combine in another art form in this scene, music. 
The multilayered connections of different types of aesthetic experiences give greater 
meaning to Perowne as he does the surgery. The music reflects how Perowne handles the 
operation; art is reflecting science. He chooses to listen to Bach’s set of Goldberg 
Variations, which was initially composed in 1741 for the clavichordist Goldberg to play 
for the Count Kaiserling when he had insomnia (Gordon 67). Just as the beauty of the 
variations had a healing effect then, helping the count overcome his insomnia, it helps 
Perowne (or, at least, makes operating more pleasurable) as he is mending Baxter’s skull. 
In addition, the music mirrors Perowne’s surgical procedures. The aria will “unfold and 
spread,” which is what Perowne is doing to the skin on Baxter’s scalp as he begins the 
operation (258). Baxter’s skin is “parted,” and “the long incision is stretched apart like a 
wide-open mouth” (258).  
Even the recording that Perowne chooses reflects his intention to heal and 
emphasizes the strong connection between science and art. Perowne has many available 
options; “[i]t is difficult to name a well-known harpsichordist or a Bach-specialist pianist 
who has not recorded…the Goldberg Variations” (Davidson). Perowne chooses “Angela 
Hewitt’s wise and silky playing which includes all the repeats” (257). That Perowne 
choice of Hewitt’s playing over the “showy unorthodoxies of Glenn Gould” might 
suggest that Perowne is not going to do anything unusual in the operation. He will not do 
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anything “unorthodox” even though he is operating on someone who, hours before, 
threatened to rape his daughter. Before this scene, Perowne’s wife had warned Perowne 
not to take revenge on Baxter, and even though Perowne never seems to seriously 
consider doing that, it remains a possibility until Perowne cauterizes the clots in Baxter’s 
brain. When Perowne picks Angela Hewitt, he displays a sort of conservatism reflected in 
his decision to treat Baxter as he does all of his other patients. The beauty of the music 
parallels the beauty in surgery; in each one, beauty itself is preserving life (or at least 
making it more pleasant) by being able to heal. 
In addition to wondering at the beauty of the brain, Perowne finds meaning in the 
beauty of natural selection and the origin of life and consciousness. These two sources of 
beauty can be understood as narratives, telling a story of order emerging from chaos. 
These stories require that we look at life reductively, examining only its biological 
processes, but such processes form a narrative that can be meaningful. “Just like the 
digital codes of replicated life held within DNA, the brain’s fundamental secret will be 
laid open one day. But even when it has, the wonder will remain, that mere wet stuff can 
make this bright inward cinema of thought” (262). Perowne expects that consciousness 
will be explained empirically; “as long as the scientists and the institutions remain in 
place, the explanations will refine themselves into an irrefutable truth about 
consciousness” (255). Because the brain has a “secret,” it will be a constant source of 
curiosity until its “irrefutable truth” is discovered.  
Even after our curiosity is exhausted, and we have found such an “irrefutable 
truth,” Perowne thinks that we will still have meaning because science will continue to 
produce wonder. Perowne compares the solution to consciousness to the “digital codes of 
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replicated life,” suggesting that how consciousness works is analogous to DNA in that it 
is a mechanistic process; the final result could — as DNA has been — be wholly 
digitized on a computer. DNA does not need any immaterial component to be 
understood; the same will apply to the present mystery of consciousness. We can learn 
everything about our consciousness, and even if what we learn also suggests that our 
thoughts are mechanized, we will still wonder at the brain because scientific progress will 
not change the meaningful narrative of contrasts. “Mere wet stuff” creates “this bright 
inward cinema of thought,” suggesting that it seems surprising that something so 
rudimentary – “mere wet stuff” – could result in our consciousness (254). The word 
“mere” contrasts with “bright,” and the word “stuff” seems dismissive when we consider 
that it is referring to the biological processes that allow for thought. This story – order 
emerging from chaos – will exist even if we are able to explain exactly how the brain 
works. Thus, even when consciousness is understood at the same level as DNA 
replication is, knowledge will not threaten the ability of science to produce wonder. 
Indeed, Perowne concludes,  “That’s the only kind of faith he has” (262).  
 This peculiar profession of faith contrasts with Perowne’s previous commitments 
to rationalism and reductionism because it is not faith in science itself, but in the wonder 
— something non-empirical — that it inspires. As Graham Hillard has commented, 
“…Perowne’s confidence in science seems itself to be imbued with spiritual 
significance” (142).  Science means more to Perowne than providing truth; it also 
provides something that can only be accessed “spiritually.” Larry Bouchard echoes 
Hillard when he suggests that Perowne “…does think of his materialism as a kind of 
faith” (451). Perowne’s “confidence” or “faith” in science seems to be that science will 
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always be a source of wonder. Earlier in the novel, Perowne thinks, “It isn’t an article of 
faith with him, he knows it for a quotidian fact, that the mind is what the brain, mere 
matter, performs” (66). Perowne does not have “faith” that the brain is a function of 
matter. His faith, instead, seems to be a declaration that science is wonderful and will 
always be wonderful. He extends faith in the progress of science as well as its ability to 
make his life meaningful by being a source of wonder. These are things that are not 
empirically provable — one points toward the future, which is always uncertain, and the 
other deals with meaning, which is not a scientific domain at all — and thus need a sort 
of faith to buttress them. It is this aspect that leads Perowne to regard science with 
religious-esqe belief. 
This semi-religious faith is shown to be in the irreducible wonder that science 
gives, and not in science itself, when Perowne talks about natural selection with his 
daughter Daisy. They are discussing a line from Philip Larkin’s poem “Water,” which 
begins, “If I were called in / To construct a religion/ I should make use of water.” 
Perowne says that if he were to make a religion, he would use evolution.  
“What better creation myth? An unimaginable sweep of time, numberless 
generations spawning by infinitesimal steps complex living beauty out of 
inert matter, driven on by the blind furies of random mutation, natural 
selection and environmental change, with the tragedy of forms continually 
dying, and lately the wonder of minds emerging and with them for 
morality, love, art, cities–– and the unprecedented bonus of the story 
happening to be demonstrably true.” (54)  
 
Perowne suggests that natural selection makes a good creation myth because it forms a 
powerful narrative. He stresses the idea that we cannot imagine it ourselves; the 
unfathomability of the “myth” makes it a constant source of curiosity. The “sweep of 
time” is “unimaginable,” generations “numberless,” and steps “infinitesimal.” There is an 
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allure to something beyond which we can imagine, both infinitely smaller and larger than 
we could comprehend. The “sweep of time” also adds to the wonder; only “lately” has 
“the wonder of minds emerg[ed].” Like the idea of “mere wet stuff” producing thought, 
here “complex living beauty” comes from “inert matter” – another story of order coming 
from chaos (262). We have survived tragedy and lived on, despite great extinctions and 
deaths.  
 Perowne finds meaning in this narrative because in addition to order, beauty 
emerges from chaos. Beauty comes from the most improbable of sources and emerges 
from the most unlikely of instruments: “blind furies of random mutation, natural 
selection, and environmental change” (54). “Blind furies” is a reference to Milton’s poem 
“Lycidas.” A pastoral elegy for Edward King, a friend of Milton’s who died young, the 
poem considers the pain of grief (Arnold 581). He writes of his friend’s death: 
“But the fair guerdon when we hope to find, 
And think to burst out into sudden blaze, 
Comes the blind Fury with th’abhorred shears, 
And slits the thin-spun life.” (Milton 73-6) 
 
As soon as we expect to be rewarded, we die. “Th’abhorred  shears” and “thin-spun life” 
is a reference to Atropos, a Moirai  — which means fate in Ancient Greek literally and 
here refers to the three goddesses of fate — who held shears to cut “the thin-spun life.” 
This suggests that death comes randomly, at the whim of fate. Humans have survived the 
randomness of tragedy in our evolutionary path. This competition means that some forms 
are “continually dying,” which suggests that the human species has triumphed over less 
successful life forms.  This adds to the overall aesthetic of the narrative by showing that 
the slow emergence of complexity from simplicity was not inevitable – organisms had to 
overcome incredible odds to eventually evolve into the human species. 
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The question of what Perowne would make a religion from is not raised as matter 
of truth at all, but begins as a question of aesthetics. Perowne’s aim is not truth, but 
instead the meaningfulness inherent in the naturalistic narrative of our origins. He thinks 
that this myth is better than religious ones not because it makes a god unnecessary, but 
because it makes nature independent. This story links all organisms together, giving an 
order to the natural world that would be complicated by the existence of a god. Christina 
Root writes,  
“The ‘brief privilege of consciousness’ that Henry believes is the ‘bracing 
consolation’ for the blind fury, war, famine and death that led to its 
emergence feels almost like a consolation not in the mature and stoic 
acceptance of that reality, but in moments in which awareness of 
separation within an isolated self disappears and a glimpse of the 
indivisible universe creates a brief sense of unity of self, others, and 
world” (73). 
 
 The story of our origin – and the lack of any supernatural intervention for our creation – 
leads to wonder for Perowne because it gives a “glimpse of the indivisible universe” 
which gives a “brief sense of unity”. Natural selection lets us see how all of us are 
connected, giving order to the universe of which we are all a part. It becomes a source of 
wonder because it tells a narrative of order coming from chaos that is both personal and 
universal; we are all a part of the overarching order. He paraphrases the conclusion to 
Darwin’s work: “Endless and beautiful forms of life, such as you see in a common 
hedgerow, including exalted beings like ourselves, arose from physical laws, from war 
and nature, famine and death. This is the grandeur” (54). Without divine help, life had to 
overcome many obstacles to exist, and survival was never inevitable nor guaranteed. For 
Perowne, the story is better without a god because it connects all of life in the common 
struggle for survival. 
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 However, Perowne knows that his explanation is blurring the lines between 
empirical truth and myth. Perowne only comments on the factuality of the “myth” at the 
end and some aspects of his “myth” are not “demonstrably true.” Perowne himself calls 
his recitation “not entirely facetious,” suggesting that some of it was facetious. As Robert 
Hazen, a research scientist and professor of earth science at George Mason University, 
writes in Genesis, “The epic history of life’s chemical origins is woefully incomplete. 
Daunting gaps exist in our knowledge, and much of what we have learned is hotly 
debated and subject to conflicting interpretations” (xiv). This does not mean that there is 
not a naturalistic explanation. It suggests only that there is no empirically confirmed 
explanation for the existence of life. Regardless, even if the myth is true, its veracity is 
not an essential part of the “myth,” but an “unprecedented bonus.” Because Perowne later 
says that “brain’s fundamental secret will be laid open one day” — meaning that the 
secret presently remains undiscovered — he must know that the full story is not yet 
“demonstrably true” (254). Perowne is conscious of his “myth” remaining what he calls it 
— a myth — and not something that is totally empirically verifiable.  
Regardless of the myth’s total veracity, what is significant is that Perowne has 
found a beautiful and wholly naturalistic “creation myth” that does, as Daisy suggests, 
give meaning in the similar way to that of religious narratives. All throughout the novel 
Perowne reminds himself not of the truth of natural selection but of its “grandeur,” 
suggesting that the beauty of the natural world is a sort of religious-like anchor to 
meaning that he returns to again and again. After reading Darwin’s Origin of Species the 
night before, he awakens to the music of his wife’s shower radio. In his semi-wakeful 
state he hallucinates from the lyrics of the music a phrase from the final paragraph of 
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Darwin’s book. “There is grandeur in this view of life, [the shower radio] says, over and 
over again” (53). Perowne “begins to sense a religious content as its significance swells” 
(53). The grandeur of the natural world inspires meaning on par with that of any religion 
– science has a “religious content.”  
 Ian McEwan has written about the necessity of narrative to meaning and how we 
need something other than empirically verified truth — such as the beauty Perowne sees 
in science — to believe in. In his essay “End of the World Blues,” he writes that 
rationalism has “yet to find an overarching narrative….to compete with the old stories 
that give meaning to people’s lives.” Naturalistic narratives of our origin might have an 
even larger purpose than giving a potentially factual origin story; like the science that 
makes the myth, the narratives become objects of beauty. As we have seen, undergirding 
almost every description of science that McEwan gives is an appreciation of beauty. The 
same applies to the narratives of science; they are meaningful not because they are true 
but because they are beautiful. McEwan writes in the same essay,  
“Natural selection is a powerful elegant and economic explicator of life on 
earth in all its diversity and perhaps it contains the seeds of a rival creation 
myth that would have added power of being true but it awaits its inspired 
synthesizer, its poet, its Milton.” (360). 
 
What is lacking for McEwan is not the raw material – we do not need to refine the 
mythology; it is all there in the science – but a communicator to show how natural 
selection, as a creation myth, and, more broadly, a narrative built around rationalism, can 
give meaning to our lives. He thinks that beauty is more persuasive than truth. 
 Pointing to the beauty in science is a powerful argument that meaning is possible 
within a naturalistic framework because the beauty in science is not open only to 
naturalists. It becomes a compelling foundation for an argument because many people of 
? ??? ?
many different beliefs agree that the natural world is beautiful. C. S. Lewis sees the same 
beauty in science. Even though he himself believes “less than half of it,” he too is drawn 
to the naturalistic creation “myths.” In his essay “Is Theology Poetry?” — composed 
after his conversion to Christianity — he writes,  
“Consider for a few moments the enormous aesthetic claim of 
[naturalism]. Is it not one of the finest myths which human imagination 
has yet produced? The play is preceded by the most austere of all 
preludes: the infinite void, and matter restlessly moving to bring forth it 
knows not what. Then, by the millionth millionth chance — what tragic 
irony — the conditions at one point of space and time bubble up into that 
tiny fermentation which is the beginning of life. Everything seems to be 
against the infant hero of our drama…But life somehow wins through…” 
(125-126) 
 
Lewis, writing about eighty years after Darwin’s publication, recognizes that the theory 
of natural selection has many characteristics of a good story. He later suggests that even 
the end of the story — the inevitable death of our Sun — fills the myth with “grandeur.” 
“All ends in nothingness and universal darkness covers all. The pattern of the myth thus 
becomes one of the noblest we can conceive” (126). The narrative natural selection gives 
is not merely good, but “one of the noblest” that anyone could write. Lewis ends echoing 
almost exactly McEwan’s sentiments, sixty years before McEwan: “There is a beauty in 
this myth which well deserves better poetic handling than it has yet received; I hope some 
great genius will yet crystallize it…” (126). Thus, for Lewis, McEwan, and Perowne, 
there is a beauty to the creation myth that transcends its veracity.  
However, the potential universality of the creation myth’s beauty forces the 
myth’s veracity into question. Lewis believes “less than half of it,” and Perowne, while 
he thinks that it is true, is more interested in how it gives him meaning. The argument for 
meaning from the beauty in science is effective because Perowne and Lewis value the 
? ??? ?
creation myth for the same reason. While they differ in regards its veracity, neither has 
truth as his foremost concern. They are more interested in beauty, and, by appealing to 
this common interest, the possibility for meaning through science exists for both because 
it does not require an empirical foundation. Perowne does not wonder at science because 
what is true happens to be beautiful and meaningful; he marvels at science because it 
gives beautiful and meaningful stories. Truth is merely a “bonus.”  
The idea of submitting to an something because it is personally meaningful or 
beautiful, instead of because it is true, surfaces again in Enduring Love. There are 
instances in this novel in which scientific ideas are favored not because of their truth, but 
their “integral” beauty. In these situations, the wonder that science produces is more 
powerful than the truth of the science itself. This parallels Perowne’s affinity for natural 
selection, which he suggests would make a good “creation myth” not because of its truth, 
but for its narrative appeal. In Enduring Love, Joe gives the example of Einstein’s 
General Theory, “that gravitation was simply an effect caused by the curvature of space-
time wrought by matter and energy” (52). The description of gravity as “simply an 
effect,” was beautiful because something previously thought to be chaotic became 
orderly. When it was tested empirically, “confirmation was flashed around the world, but 
inaccurate or inconvenient data were overlooked in the desire to embrace the theory.” 
The theory was “already in the textbooks” thirty years before there was “incontrovertible 
experimental verification.” There was a “desire” to “embrace” the idea before it was ever 
empirically proven because the theory was beautiful. Joe concludes, “its integral power 
was so great, it was too beautiful to resist” (53). People wanted to believe that Einstein’s 
General Theory was correct, and found meaning in it before it was empirically true. This 
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suggests that meaning, even if it is found in science, is not rooted primarily in rationality. 
We have a proclivity to accept things as true even if they are not proven to be true yet; 
our desire for beauty can lead us to compromise a commitment to total rationality. 
 The same idea surfaces later in the novel, in which, like Einstein’s General 
Theory, the double helix structure of DNA is meaningful before it is proven true. At 
Clarissa’s birthday party later in the novel, Joe tells the story of the discovery of DNA’s 
structure to suggest that there is a connection between beauty and scientific truth. When 
Rosalind Franklin saw Crick and Watson’s DNA model, “she said it was simply too 
beautiful not to be true…” (179). This is a perfect cue for Joe to give his gift to Clarissa, 
a first edition of Keats’ first collection of poems. He quotes Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn,” saying, “Beauty is truth, truth beauty…” as he gives it to her (179). The beauty of 
the model was indicative of its truth for Franklin. Beauty becomes helpful in this instance 
because it highlights the intrinsic orderliness of the DNA molecules, leading to a true 
explanation of our genetic storage. While a desire to wonder at scientific beauty might 
lead us to believe things that are not empirically proven yet, beauty might also be a guide 
that helps us discover what can be proven true.  
 However, not all scientific theories are beautiful and not all that is beautiful is 
true. When this is the case, a desire for beauty and meaning can hinder scientific 
progress. Joe finds an example of a theory not accepted — a theory of quantum 
electrodynamics — and suggests that “the theory was unattractive, inelegant, it was a 
song sung out of tune. Acceptance withheld on grounds of ugliness” (53). If Joe’s 
explanation is correct, the desire for beauty hindered the progress of science. This 
complicates the meaning that is found in scientific discoveries because it suggests that 
? ??? ?
instead of wondering at something that has the “unprecedented bonus of being 
demonstrably true,” we might be wondering at something that only has the appearance of 
being true. Instead of being grounded in truth, or empirical verifiability, meaning is found 
in what is beautiful, and the desire for beauty is so strong that it can lead to a compromise 
in truth. 
 By showing how Perowne finds wonder in the brain and in naturalistic 
explanations of our origins, McEwan shows how a naturalistic framework allows for 
meaning. The absence of God allows for a more compelling “creation myth” – instead of 
humans coming into existence immediately, there is a slow, long process that makes a 
compelling narrative of order emerging from chaos. However, McEwan also shows that a 
desire to experience wonder is often more powerful than the desire to understand 
something accurately. A desire for meaningful beauty can make us forget or ignore the 
boundary between fact and faith.  
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Conclusion 
The Complication of the Convert 
 
There wasn’t really much else to do. Make something, and die. After the 
coffee he recrossed the room and remained standing, stooped over the 
keyboard in his overcoat, while he played with both hands by the exhausted 
afternoon light the notes as he had written them. Almost right, almost the 
truth. – Ian McEwan, Amsterdam 
 
While in the preceding chapters I have noted the occasional challenge to establishing 
meaning without any absolutes, the general idea has been that meaning is, in spite of 
some difficulties, achievable. However, in my conclusion, I want to show how in The 
Children Act McEwan complicates, possibly without the hope of any resolution, the 
challenge of finding meaning without God. In McEwan’s work before The Children Act, 
problems of finding meaning without any absolutes – the problem of arbitrariness in 
deciding when love matters, the difficulty of understanding what a genuine response to 
beauty is, and the potential for a proclivity to wonder to obfuscate scientific progress – 
have not been terminal. While there are some difficulties, they do not pose 
insurmountable challenges, and most of his characters are satisfied with the meaning 
found in the natural world. However, The Children Act paints a very different picture, 
suggesting that when one is transitioning from a supernatural framework (in this case, 
that of a Jehovah’s Witness) to an atheistic one, it is possible for all the previous 
? ??? ?
resources of meaning that McEwan has proposed – art, music, literature, education – to 
fail. 
 Fiona, the protagonist in The Children Act, feels as if life is meaningless 
whenever she considers the absence of any absolutes. Before she makes her decision in 
Adam’s case – whether or not to force him to have a blood transfusion in violation of his 
faith – she visits him in the hospital and responds nihilistically to a poem that he reads 
her. He has written about how “Satan’s hammer” (his leukemia) will “flatten his soul into 
a sheet of gold that reflects God’s love on everyone” (113). The poem – essentially a 
consolation if Adam, refusing a transfusion, dies – leaves Fiona feeling “unpleasantly 
light-headed, emptied out, all meaning gone” (116). She falls briefly into nihilism:  
“The blasphemous notion came to her that it didn’t much matter either 
way whether the boy lived or died. Everything would be much the same. 
Profound sorrow, bitter regret perhaps, fond memories, then life would 
plunge on and all three would mean less and less as those who loved him 
aged and died, until they meant nothing at all.” (116) 
 
The finitude of life, while giving meaning to Adam (who does not see it as finite to begin 
with) leads to meaninglessness for Fiona.  
This is not unusual for Fiona; her experiences with other cases sometimes make 
her look at life from a wholly naturalistic perspective. When she recalls a case about 
conjoined twins, “She saw in the remembered pictures of Matthew and Mark a blind and 
purposeless nullity” (31). There is nothing meaningful behind the twins’ lives. “No 
cruelty, nothing avenged, no ghost moving in mysterious ways,” she continues. “A 
process of natural wastage as indifferent as it was pointless. Which only brought into 
relief healthy, perfectly formed life, equally contingent, equally without purpose” (31). 
There is nothing more to life than that which is physical, and life is meaningless. Because 
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she feels like life is meaningless, when she encounters Adam, she does not feel like it is 
fair for her to be the judge of this situation. In the absence of all moral absolutes, it is not 
clear that she is morally right – or that there is any “morally right” thing – to force Adam 
to do anything. “Religions, moral systems, her own included, were like peaks in a dense 
mountain range seen from a great distance, none obvious higher, more important, truer 
than another. What was to judge?” (116).  Her use of the word what suggests that she 
does not think that there is anyone who can judge. It also suggests that there is no higher 
standard – no absolute, no real, useful definition of good or evil – that could suggest that 
a certain action, such as Adam taking a blood transfusion to avoid death, is better than 
any other. Neither a person, nor any idea of goodness, could judge. As we saw previously 
in Nietzsche, the absence of absolutes leads to nihilism.  
Whenever Fiona is about to leave, an aesthetic experience makes her feel meaning 
again. The aesthetic experience that she has is so powerful that it makes her feel that 
Adam’s life, and her own, have value. The sharp contrast that McEwan gives us – her 
nihilistic thoughts are detailed right before her experience with music – suggests that he 
is trying to emphasize how powerful and effective the aesthetic experience is for her.  She 
sees a violin on Adam’s hospital bed and mentions it to “turn the conversation away from 
his condition” (118). As he plays Benjamin Britten’s setting of Yeats’ poem “Down by 
the Sally Gardens,” she is deeply moved: 
“The melancholy tune and the manner in which it was played, so hopeful, 
so raw, expressed everything she was beginning to understand about the 
boy. She knew by heart the poet’s words of regret. But I, being young and 
foolish…hearing Adam play stirred her, even as it baffled her. To take up 
the violin or any instrument was an act of hope, it implied a future.” (119) 
 
Again, as it was for Baxter when he heard Arnold’s poem and Perowne when he listens to 
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the blues, aesthetic experiences bring hope. His “performance, his look of straining 
dedication” and “the scratchy inexpert sounds he made, so expressive of guileless 
longing,” move Fiona so deeply that “to contain the emotion she felt,” she mentions a 
mistake Adam made in reading the music (120). By pointing the incorrect note out to 
Adam, she reveals how overcome she is by Adam’s playing: she does not even know 
what to say, and almost tries to reduce her experience into the technical elements that 
produced it, making it less meaningful and easier for her to understand. She offers to sing 
with him and he accompanies her on his violin. As a result of the music, she becomes the 
opposite of nihilistic, believing now that her own moral peak is higher than the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’. Her earlier thoughts questioning the value of his life, or the importance of her 
decision, are gone when she listens to him playing the violin and when she sings with 
him.  
Adam is initially as receptive to the meaning that the experience gives him as 
Fiona is. Months after their initial encounter, Fiona receives a letter from Adam that talks 
about his loss of faith (he has symbolically put his Bible “out in the hall facedown on a 
chair”) and remembers their experience with music: 
“I feel like you’ve brought me close to something else, something really 
beautiful and deep, but I don’t really know what it is. You never told me 
what you believed in, but I loved it when you came and sat with me and 
we did ‘The Sally Gardens.’” (145) 
 
Adam had the same experience of meaning that Fiona did. Even if he cannot explain what 
the experience “brought [him] close to,” he knows that it is meaningful and is grateful to 
Fiona for saving his life. In the months after the transfusion, he continues to play the 
violin and read poetry. He boasts to Fiona in another letter, “I can almost get through this 
piece by Bach without a mistake. I can do the theme from Coronation Street. I’ve been 
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reading Berryman’s Dream Songs. I’m going to be in a play, and I’ve got to do all my 
exams before Christmas. And thanks to you I’m full of Yeats!” (170). He is excited about 
his artistic endeavors, playing the violin, poetry, and acting. He is also progressing well 
in school, which suggests that he is most likely being exposed to, among other 
disciplines, science, which gives meaning to Perowne and Joe. All of these things fill 
Adam with hope – he is looking forward to a future full of aesthetic experiences that give 
meaning to him.  
However, aesthetic experience gives meaning to Adam only transiently. He has 
all of the resources at his disposal that other characters in McEwan’s novels have – 
literature, music, education – but, unlike them, he does not derive meaning from them. 
When the leukemia returns, Adam, now eighteen and allowed by law to make his own 
medical decisions, refuses a transfusion. His lungs fill with blood and he drowns. 
Whether or not Adam’s death is a suicide or the result of actual religious convictions 
remains uncertain. Either case, though, would indicate that he could not establish 
meaning within a naturalistic framework that did not require interpretation; if he commits 
suicide, he is nihilistic, and if has returned to his faith, he uses the supernatural to find 
meaning. Thus, even though Adam enjoys many aesthetic experiences as both an artist 
and an observer, he does not think that they alone give sufficient meaning to life. 
It is only after Adam’s death that Fiona realizes that his visit represented a crisis 
of meaning. Fiona thinks that his death is a suicide and attributes it to his inability to find 
meaning (218). He came to her in Newcastle “wanting what everyone wanted, and what 
only free-thinking people, not the supernatural, could give. Meaning” (220). But she does 
not give it to him: “Without faith, how open and beautiful and terrifying the world must 
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have seemed to him…Adam came looking for her and she offered nothing in religion’s 
place, no protection” (220). While Fiona thinks that the supernatural could not give 
meaning, and that the world must have been “beautiful” (even if it is also terrifying) 
without religion, she does not explain how Adam could have experienced meaning 
without God. Even though she is convinced of the superiority of naturalism to give 
atheism meaning, she does not articulate her position – McEwan leaves uncertain 
whether this is because she lacks the ability or does not recognize its importance to Adam 
– when she most needs to.  
However, Adam’s inability to take Fiona’s view – that something could be 
inherently meaningful without being connected to the transcendent – may have been due 
to the difficulties that come with changing his mind about what he believes. Instead of 
finding Fiona’s view insufficient, Adam may have failed to find meaning because he 
realized that all sources of meaning are grounded in uncertainty. The act of conversion – 
deciding that previous beliefs were wrong – may lead to questions about the possibility of 
any interpretation being correct. We see this when he follows Fiona to Newcastle and 
tells her that he now recognizes the “foolishness” of his newly forsaken faith. However, 
he does not have anything to replace it. “…[O]nce you take a step back from the 
Witnesses, you might as well go all the way. Why replace one tooth fairy with another?” 
(171). No “tooth fairy” – belief – is better than any other. Adam, to some extent, becomes 
a postmodernist: Rejecting all meta-narratives, he questions everything and nothing has 
inherent value. As a result, he can find meaning in nothing. Nietzsche considers the 
difficulty of conversions and finding meaning in other ways in The Will to Power: 
“The end of the moral interpretation of the world, which no longer has any 
sanction after it has tried to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism. 
? ??? ?
‘Everything lacks meaning’ (the untenability of one interpretation of the 
world, upon which a tremendous amount of energy has been lavished, 
awakens the suspicion that all interpretations of the world are false).” (7) 
 
Once Adam questioned his own interpretation of the world, his “suspicion” was 
“awakened” that any other interpretation might be false. He could not establish meaning 
from a naturalistic standpoint because meaning – by its subjective nature – requires that 
he interpret something. Nietzsche seems to have been correct – the recognized 
“untenability” of an idea has the potential to lead to nihilism.  
Without the possibility of an interpretation, and the sort of “suspension of 
disbelief” that is required to designate things as irreducible and inherently meaningful, 
nihilism seems to be the inevitable and logical result. Perowne, Joe, and Fiona find 
meaning precisely because they are willing, as McEwan has stated he is, to believe in 
certain ideas like love, beauty, and wonder. But whenever one submits to pure reason, 
whenever literature is removed from our “common nature,” leaving only logical 
explanations, nihilism results. When Adam suggests that he should not merely exchange 
his Jehovah’s Witness faith for another “tooth fairy,” Fiona replies, “Perhaps everyone 
needs tooth fairies” (171). We need some sort of belief to avoid nihilism, and when 
atheism allows for meaning, it calls upon more than logical explanations. The difference 
between atheism (that is not nihilistic) and theism becomes less of a matter of belief and 
more of a question of what we decide is irreducible. For the theist, reductionism ends at 
God; for the non-nihilistic atheist, it ends somewhere before we encounter the ultimate 
(because there is no ultimate). For both, there is some version of faith, some “suspension 
of disbelief” that opens up the non-empirical for us to find meaning. What Samuel 
Coleridge writes in his Biographia Literaria may apply not only to reading the poems he 
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contributed to his Lyrical Ballads, but to all of life: 
“…my endeavors should be directed to persons and characters 
supernatural, or at least romantic, yet so as to transfer from our inward 
nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for 
these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the 
moment, which constitutes poetic faith.” (C. XIV) 
 
For McEwan and all of the New Atheists who argue powerfully for meaning, it is not 
“persons and characters supernatural” written into poetry that they believe in. Instead, it 
is in love, in beauty, and in wonder experienced in their lives. Even though these things 
are not empirical and cannot be accounted for by logic or science, they bear to the New 
Atheists enough “semblance of truth” that a “willing suspension of disbelief” in their 
logical faculties allows them to experience meaning and seems not to contradict their 
commitments to rationality. If Adam had been able to suspend his disbelief, not in God, 
but in the meaningful beauty of music, perhaps his life would have been saved. The New 
Atheists, though – and McEwan’s Joe, Perowne, and Fiona with them – try to be rational 
and then proceed to have a “poetic faith,” not in God or life after death, but in the sated 
meaningfulness of our earthly pleasures: in love, in beauty, and in wonder. By this act of 
belief, the natural world – and not the supernatural – can be an abundant source of 
meaning.  
However, this act of belief is complicated, bringing with it just as many questions 
and uncertainties as it solves. Saturday ends as Perowne lies down in bed at the end of a 
long day full of many of the things that make his life meaningful: He has made love to his 
wife, enjoyed the blues and classical music, and experienced the beauty of the brain 
firsthand. As he goes to sleep, he thinks, “There’s only this” (289). For Perowne, this is, 
in the words of Christopher Hitchens, “wondrous enough.” But McEwan knows that for 
? ??? ?
some of us – Adam, for example – this wholly natural world is not enough to give 
meaning. There is another level of arbitrariness introduced. While my previous chapters 
have suggested that we decide when love is real and when beauty matters, it seems like 
we also decide when these things are enough, when we have achieved or experienced 
enough love, beauty, or wonder to say that our lives are meaningful. Such a decision may 
not be totally voluntary, in the same way that Baxter’s response to the poem might have 
been as much a symptom of a disease as much as it was an effect of beauty. Some of us 
can lead lives that feel personally meaningful without the sort of transcendent meaning 
that belief in God gives, and some of us cannot.  
Thus, while McEwan challenges the idea that atheism is inevitably nihilistic, he 
also brings into question the universality of the meaning that the natural world can 
provide. Nevertheless, we can bridge the gap between “only this” and meaning with 
belief. Such belief might be in God, love, beauty or wonder, but it will always be 
something that is beyond the empirically verifiable. Whatever we choose to believe, this 
leap beyond knowledge, into the realm of faith, brings with it its own challenges. In any 
case, it seems that regardless of what meets the criteria of “wondrous enough” for each of 
us, we might all agree that the conditions of belief are more bearable than the nihilism 
that exists in its absence.  
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